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Religious Freedom in the UK after the 
Human Rights Act 1998
Ian Leigh*
According to a book title chosen by one commentator on the UK’s Human Rights 
Act 1998, Professor Francesca Klug, human rights are Values for a Godless Age.1 No 
doubt before the events of September 11 2001 the secularization thesis had a certain 
resonance. The legislation could be seen as a (very faint) shadow of that great hymn 
of the secular state — the French Declaration of the Rights of Man. Certainly some 
religious organisations feared that rather than the Human Rights Act 1998 enhancing 
their religious freedom it would be used against them and they therefore sought — 
unsuccessfully — guarantees against litigation in the form of exemptions.2 A decade 
later, the revolutionary fervour has cooled somewhat and an assessment can be made 
of the treatment of religious liberty under the Act to date. We now know also that 
the obituary notices for religious faith were premature, even in (comparatively) 
secular Western Europe: ‘God is Back’ as another recent book title has it.3 Indeed, 
the resurgence of a vigorous religious discourse in public life in the UK is perhaps 
not just a reaction to secularization but in a sense also evidence of a growing human 
rights culture following incorporation of the European Convention.
*  I am grateful to Peter Edge for helpful comments on an earlier draft. The usual caveat applies.
1 Francesca Klug, Values for a Godless Age: The Story of Britain’s New Bill of Rights (1998). 
2 Peter Cumper, ‘The Protection of Religious Rights under Section 13 of the Human Rights Act’ 
[2000] Public Law 254; Ian Leigh, ‘Towards a Christian Approach to Religious Liberty’ in Paul 
Beaumont (ed), Christian Perspectives on Human Rights and Legal Philosophy (1998) 64-71.
3 John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, God is Back: How the Global Rise of Faith is Changing 
the World (2009).
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The focus in this chapter is on a handful of the more controversial religious liberty 
claims that have come before the courts since 2000.4 I have selected these for the 
range and variety or issues that they raise directly concerned with claims to manifest 
religious belief.5 These include whether Christian parents have a right that their 
children be educated in private schools in accordance with their religious beliefs 
on discipline; whether a Muslim schoolgirl has the right to wear a jilbab, contrary 
to the school uniform policy of her (mixed) state secondary school; whether a 
Hindu community can resist an order for the destruction of a diseased bullock 
of sacred religious signiﬁcance to them; and whether orthodox Hindus should be 
accommodated in their wish for cremation upon an open-air funeral pyre.
In fact, each of these claims ultimately failed (although the funeral pyre decision was 
successfully appealed on other grounds). Nevertheless, the hurdles that the applicants 
faced and the reasons for failure yield some important lessons about the treatment 
of religious liberty claims.
The constraints of the article 9 Strasbourg jurisprudence
The UK Human Rights Act 1998 is an Act to give further effect to the European 
Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’) in UK law. It does so by two primary 
mechanisms: a strong duty on the courts to interpret primary and secondary 
legislation as far as possible compatibly with Convention rights (section 3)6 and a 
duty on public authorities (including the courts) to act in conformity with a person’s 
Convention rights (section 6). In both instances UK courts and tribunals are to ‘take 
account’ of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights concerning 
the meaning of Convention rights.7
4 The Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) came into force on 2 October 2000.
5 This is not a comprehensive treatment of all Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) cases concerning 
religion. It does not include R (Pretty) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2002] 1 AC 800, in which 
art 9 was raised peripherally if unsuccessfully in a challenge to the law on assisted suicide, or R 
(Baiai, Trzcinska, Bigoku & Tilki) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] 1 WLR 
693 where religious discrimination under art 14 of the European Convention (which prevents 
discrimination in the enjoyment of Convention rights inter alia on grounds of religion) was 
raised in subsidiary argument. Also excluded is discussion of the litigation in which the House 
of Lords found that a Parochial Church Council of the Church of England was not a public 
authority within the meaning of the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK): Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote 
with Billesley PCC v Wallbank [2004] 1 AC 546.
6 Where this is not possible, the higher courts may issue a declaration of incompatibility drawing 
Parliament’s attention to the inconsistency: Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) s 4.
7 Human Rights Act 1998, s 2. For a much more detailed general treatment, see Ian Leigh and 
Roger Masterman, Making Rights Real: The UK Human Rights Act in its First Decade (2008).
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Among the Convention rights so incorporated into UK law is article 9:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right 
includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in 
worship, teaching, practice and observance.
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals or for 
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
What use has been made of this provision since October 2000 when the Human 
Rights Act 1998 came into force?
Firstly, it is clear that in conformity with their general approach, the UK courts 
are reluctant to give enhanced protection rights over and above that enjoyed at 
Strasbourg. This has disappointed one of the hopes for the Human Rights Act 1998, 
that it would lead to British judges giving a conﬁdent lead to other jurisdictions 
and to the European Court of Human Rights itself in the way that, for example, 
the German Constitutional Court has. If anything, the potential for doing so was 
greater with religious liberty than other rights since the Strasbourg jurisprudence 
developed very late (the ﬁrst major cases were not decided until the 1990s) and the 
protection is weak by comparison with free speech or privacy.
In practice, however, UK courts have essentially tracked the limitations of the 
Strasbourg approach, although some domestic judges have voiced occasional 
misgivings. In Ullah, unsuccessful appeals were brought by two failed asylum-seekers, 
a Pakistani member of the Ahmadhiya faith and a Vietnamese Roman Catholic, 
who feared persecution if returned to their respective countries. The House of Lords 
refused to extend the principle under Convention jurisprudence that a deporting 
or extraditing state is liable for torture or inhuman or degrading treatment at the 
hands of the state to which a person is removed8 to cover religious persecution. The 
European Court of Human Rights had not clearly extended the principle to cover 
denial of article 9 rights and the appellate committee held that it should not take 
this step either.9
8 Soering v United Kingdom (1989) 11 EHRR 439; Chahal v United Kingdom (1996) 23 EHRR 413.
9 Of their Lordships, Lord Caswell came closest to allowing the possibility in a ﬂagrant case (which 
did not apply on the facts here), as conceptually consistent with the ECtHR’s reasoning (R (on 
the application of Ullah) v Special Adjudicator; Do v Immigration Appeal Tribunal [2004] UKHL 
26), although in such cases art 3 would probably also be engaged.
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As Lord Bingham put it:
It is of course open to member states to provide for rights more generous than 
those guaranteed by the Convention, but such provision should not be a product 
of interpretation of the Convention by national courts, since the meaning of the 
Convention should be uniform throughout the states party to it. The duty of 
national courts is to keep pace with the Strasbourg jurisprudence as it evolves over 
time: no more, but certainly no less.10
Similarly, in Copsey v WWB Devon Clays Ltd11 the Court of Appeal found that an 
employee’s freedom to manifest his religion under article 9 of the ECHR was not 
infringed when he was dismissed for refusing to work on Sundays. Mummery LJ 
applied the so-called ‘non-interference’ line of jurisprudence from the European 
Commission of Human Rights, and held that article 9(1) was not engaged because Mr 
Copsey was entitled to resign if his employer’s work requirements were incompatible 
with manifesting his religion.12 He found that, although much-criticised, this line of 
authority was clear and, in the absence of a change of heart at Strasbourg or a different 
view from the House of Lords, should apply.13 Rix LJ stressed that this approach had 
the virtue of giving primacy to the autonomy of the parties and concluded that 
he had ‘no difﬁculty with the general thesis that contracts freely entered into may 
limit an applicant’s room for complaint about interference with his rights’.14 For 
those who hoped that the UK courts would give a broader interpretation of religious 
freedom to overcome the limitations of the article 9 jurisprudence, Copsey came as a 
disappointment.15
10 Ibid [20] (Lord Bingham).
11 [2005] EWCA Civ 932.
12 See especially Stedman v United Kingdom (1997) 23 EHHR 168; Rex Ahdar and Ian Leigh, 
Religious Freedom in the Liberal State (2005) 176–179, 298 ff; Gillian Morris, ‘Exclusion of 
Fundamental Rights by Agreement’ (2001) 30 Industrial Law Journal 49.
13 Copsey v WWB Devon Clays Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 932 [26-39] (Mummery LJ).
14 See especially at [52], referring to Ahmad v ILEA [1978] QB 36 and Ahmad v United Kingdom 
(1981) 4 EHRR 126 (refusal of time off for Muslim teacher to attend Friday prayers did not 
violate art 9). Rix LJ went on to ﬁnd that unfair dismissal legislation could, even disregarding art 
9, contain a concept of reasonable accommodation of religion: at [67-73]. Cf the judgment of 
Neuberger LJ.
15 A case on similar facts would now be treated as an example of indirect religious discrimination 
under the Equality Act 2010 (UK), in which case the question of voluntary acceptance of the 
limitation is not relevant: see, eg (under earlier legislation), R (on the application of Watkins-Singh) 
v Governing Body of Aberdare Girls High School [2008] EWHC 1865 (Admin).
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Testing religious claims
A further major constraint on the development of article 9 comes from Strasbourg 
jurisprudence in the so-called Arrowsmith test.16 This states that not all actions 
motivated by religious belief qualify, rather only those ‘intimately connected’ 
with the beliefs in question. Arguably, this approach (sometimes referred to as the 
necessity link or test) puts a gloss on the text of article 9 and has the effect of limiting 
religious liberty claims at the deﬁnitional stage, rather than as the structure of article 
9 suggests at the stage of applying the ‘necessary in a democratic society’ test under 
article 9(2).
This aspect of the article 9 approach has led domestic courts under the Human 
Rights Act 1998 to apply a threshold test to establish whether the beliefs or practices 
fall within the ambit of article 9 in the ﬁrst place.17 Judges in the common law 
world are aware of course of their lack of competence to rule on theological matters 
and the danger of interfering in disputes affecting the internal affairs of organized 
religions. These factors point toward judicial modesty and the hurdles are therefore 
set low. Even in this weakened form, however, they have tripped some litigants and in 
practice, some domestic judges appear to be operating a more demanding standard 
than in Strasbourg (where it is exceptionally rare for the court to rule that a belief 
that an applicant claims is religious is not in fact18).
 The clearest example of the application of the threshold comes in R (on the application 
of Playfoot) v Governing Body of Millais School19 in which a 16-year old schoolgirl 
challenged the refusal by her school under its policy against the wearing of jewellery 
of permission for her to wear a ‘purity ring’. The ring symbolised her commitment 
to celibacy before marriage, which she claimed was a manifestation of her religious 
belief as a Christian in pre-marital sexual abstinence. She argued that the school’s 
refusal violated her right to manifest her belief and was (in view of the school’s policy 
to permit some religious jewellery items) discriminatory contrary to article 14 of 
the Convention. Michael Supperstone QC (sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge) 
16 Arrowsmith v United Kingdom Application 7050/75 (1980) 19 Eur Comm HR 5.
17 Art 9 gives an absolute right to freedom of belief (the so-called inner forum: C v the United 
Kingdom, Application 10358/83 (1984) 37 Eur Comm HR 142, 147) covering beliefs of all 
kinds. The right to manifest beliefs is however qualiﬁed and only applies to religious beliefs. 
18 Valsamis v Greece (1996) 24 EHRR 294 is an instance of the ECtHR so ruling. The Court found 
that participation in a National Day parade did not violate the applicant’s paciﬁst beliefs as 
Jehovah’s Witnesses, despite their claim that it did. 
19 [2007] EWHC 1698. See also Gallagher (Valuation Ofﬁcer) v Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints [2008] UKHL 56, in which the House of Lords held that the requirement under rating 
legislation for a place of worship to be open to the public in order to qualify for charitable relief 
did not violate arts 9 or 14 in the case of a Mormon temple. The majority (Lord Scott dissenting) 
found that there was no impediment on the right to manifest religion or belief.
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found no ‘intimate link’ between the wearing of the ring and belief in celibacy before 
marriage for religious reasons. Consequently, it could not be said that in wearing the 
ring that the claimant was manifesting her religion.20
A similar conclusion was reached at ﬁrst instance in Williamson in which Elias J in 
the High Court21 and Buxton LJ in the Court of Appeal22 found (in the context of 
a challenge brought by a number of Christian independent schools to the statutory 
ban on the use of corporal punishment) that parental discipline of children was a 
peripheral concern to Christian belief. This approach was not, however, followed 
by other members of the Court of Appeal or by the House of Lords.23 As Lord 
Bingham’s speech argues:
[I]t is not for the court to embark on an inquiry into the asserted belief and judge 
its ‘validity’ by some objective standard such as the source material upon which the 
claimant founds his belief or the orthodox teaching of the religion in question or the 
extent to which the claimant’s belief conforms to or differs from the views of others 
professing the same religion … 24
There is a clear danger in a court’s assuming the role of theological arbiter over a 
litigant’s beliefs in this way. Once the sincerity of the plaintiff ’s beliefs has been 
accepted then it really should not matter whether the beliefs in question are peripheral 
or minority ones — they are nonetheless entitled to be considered as religious beliefs. 
(This does not mean, of course, that they are therefore automatically entitled to 
priority over other interests.)
One alternative is that judges will increasingly be drawn into hearing expert 
evidence on whether the beliefs in question are orthodox according to the religion 
in question. An example is the recent claim in Ghai v Newcastle CC25 by orthodox 
20 Moreover, in any event she had voluntarily accepted the uniform policy of the school and there 
were other means open to her to practice her belief without undue hardship or inconvenience. 
Even had there been an interference it would have been proportionate because of the sound 
reasons based on promoting school identity, minimising differences of appearance and bullying, 
and promoting high standards and conduct underlying the school’s policy on uniform. Nor was 
there any evidence of breach of art 14 since although the school had made exceptions to its policy 
on occasion to accommodate other pupils this was after careful inquiry that wearing the items 
involved (which included a Kara bracelet in the case of one Sikh pupil) were required by the 
pupil’s religion.
21 R (on the application of Williamson) v Secretary of State for Education and Employment [2001] 
EWHC Admin 960 [44-5].
22 Ibid [26-9, 57-8].
23 [2005] UKHL 15.
24 Ibid [22]. 
25 [2009] EWHC 978 (Admin). 
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Hindus that they be allowed by Newcastle City Council to hold open-air funeral 
pyres26 — a claim supported by a Sikh temple but opposed by the Ministry of 
Justice, both intervening in the litigation. Cranston J’s judgment evaluated the 
conﬂicting evidence of four experts submitted by the parties and intervenors as 
to Hindu and Sikh funeral practices, as well as related academic literature. This 
included evidence as to Hindu beliefs and practices from a professor at a Hindu 
university, from a consultant anthropologist, and from a specialist in death and 
bereavement in the British Hindu communities.
Cranston J concluded that although belief in the need for cremation on an open air 
funeral pyre was a minority belief among British Hindus generally, in the case of 
orthodox Hindus like the applicant that the belief in the practice was, nevertheless, 
central. However, in the case of a Sikh temple that had also intervened in the litigation 
this was not the case, since open-air funeral pyres were a matter of a tradition rather 
than belief. Although the judge’s survey of funeral rites is fascinating and informative 
one is nevertheless left wondering about the value of exercise in determining what 
was supposed to be a cursory threshold check on the sincerity and cogency of the 
beliefs in question.27 Ironically, despite this painstaking examination by the judge, 
the Court of Appeal later concluded that there was no necessary conﬂict between the 
applicant’s beliefs and the legislation governing cremations.28
It is clear, however, that in the light of the approach in Ghai that would-be litigants 
would now be well-advised to ﬁrst martial their experts. Well-established religions 
with well-known or widely shared beliefs are clearly at an advantage here.29 Although 
it should not matter how widely held the beliefs in question are, plainly where they 
can be shown to be conventional views this makes the evidential task easier.
26 A claim for judicial review of the Council’s refusal to set aside land for open-air funeral pyres 
for cremation according to orthodox Hindu practice. The law on cremation made it a criminal 
offence to cremate human remains other than in a licensed crematorium.
27 Cranston J found that case law compelled him to apply a threshold test and determine whether 
an open-air funeral pyre fell within core beliefs (at [101]).
28 R (on the application of Ghai) v Newcastle CC and the Secretary of State [2010] EWCA Civ 59. For 
discussion of further aspects of Cranston J’s judgment see below (text at n 39). 
29 In a different context, a former Archbishop of Canterbury (Lord Carey) has suggested that some 
cases be heard by a panel of judges with greater familiarity and understanding of religious issues: 
McFarlane v Relate [2010] IRLR 872 (unsuccessful religious discrimination claim brought by 
a counsellor who declined to offer sexual counselling to same-sex couples). The suggestion was 
robustly rejected by Laws LJ (at [16-7]). See P Parkinson, ‘Accommodating Religious Belief in 
a Secular Age: The Issue of Conscientious Objection in the Workplace’ (2011) 34 University of 
New South Wales Law Journal 281, 288–90.  
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Proportionality and restrictions on religious liberty
Establishing that the beliefs or practice in question are religious is of course only 
the ﬁrst hurdle, since religious liberty both under the ECHR and the ICCPR is 
a qualiﬁed right, subject to limitation. The ‘necessary in a democratic society’ test 
under article 9(2) of the ECHR suggests a high burden of justiﬁcation on the state but 
this has often turned out to be illusory in practice. The European Court of Human 
Rights has not itself been completely consistent: on one occasion, for example, it 
denied an article 9 claim because the applicants (Orthodox Jews facing considerable 
difﬁculty in obtaining meat slaughtered in accordance with their religious dietary 
requirements) had not shown that it was ‘impossible’ to do so.30
Although some UK judges have expressed dissatisfaction with this approach, in the 
light of their overall approach to taking into account Convention jurisprudence 
under section 2 of the Human Rights Act 1998, they have felt obliged to replicate it 
where article 9 cases have arisen in the domestic courts.
In Begum, the House of Lords upheld a state secondary school’s refusal for a pupil 
to wear the jilbab (a loose-ﬁtting garment covering the entire body except for the 
head, face and hands), contrary to the policy on school uniform. The school’s policy 
already permitted Muslim girls to wear the shalwar kameez (comprising a tunic and 
trousers), and allowed those who wished to do so to wear the hijab (a headscarf ). The 
majority of the House of Lords (Lords Bingham, Hoffmann and Scott) considered 
that the facts that Shabina Begum had been content to comply with the policy on 
uniform until her religious views changed, that she had joined the school knowing 
the policy and that there were other state schools available to her where she could 
wear the jilbab meant that there was no interference with her rights under article 9.31 
As Lord Hoffmann put it:
30 Jewish Liturgical Assn Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v France (Application 27417/95) 27 June 2000.
31 The approach of the majority in Begum was followed in R (On the application of X) v The 
Headteacher of Y School [2007] EWHC 298 (Admin), concerning the refusal of a selective all-
girls Grammar school to allow a 12-year-old Muslim girl to wear a niqab veil (a veil which 
covered her entire face and head except her eyes). Silber J held that art 9 was engaged but 
that the school had not interfered with the pupil’s rights since she had an offer to attend an 
alternative school where she would be permitted to wear the niqab veil. Even had there been 
interference, however, Silber J held that it would have been justiﬁed under art 9(2). The 
conclusion was based on the absence of prior rulings from the European Court of Human 
Rights or domestic courts of interference with art 9 where a claimant could without excessive 
difﬁculty manifest or practice their religion as they wished in another place or in another 
way: at [38].
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Article 9 does not require that one should be allowed to manifest one’s religion at 
any time and place of one’s own choosing. Common civility also has a place in the 
religious life.32
The minority were more sceptical of this application of the Strasbourg approach, 
however: Lord Nicholls laid more weight on the costs involved in changing schools 
and Baroness Hale emphasised that a choice of school was usually made by parents 
rather pupils. Notwithstanding this difference, all their Lordships found any 
interference to be justiﬁed under article 9(2). Their Lordships considered that the 
school had done its best to accommodate conﬂicting beliefs about school dress in a 
conscientious way. As Baroness Hale argued:
Social cohesion is promoted by the uniform elements of shirt, tie and jumper, and 
the requirement that all outer garments be in the school colour. But cultural and 
religious diversity is respected by allowing girls to wear either a skirt, trousers, or the 
shalwar kameez, and by allowing those who wished to do so to wear the hijab. This 
was indeed a thoughtful and proportionate response to reconciling the complexities 
of the situation. This is demonstrated by the fact that girls have subsequently 
expressed their concern that if the jilbab were to be allowed they would face pressure 
to adopt it even though they do not wish to do so.33
The House of Lords also gave general advice on approaching proportionality claims. 
In his speech, Lord Hoffmann was particularly critical of the Court of Appeal’s 
suggestion that the school governors should have asked a structured series of 
questions before ﬁnding that the article 9 right could be displaced.34 This was a 
misguidedly formalistic approach: what mattered was the substance of the decision 
not the process for reaching it.
Following this general approach few judgments undertake anything approaching a 
rigorous analysis of whether it is ‘necessary in a democratic society’ to restrict the right 
under article 9(2). An honourable exception, however, was the ﬁrst instance decision 
in a case that became a cause célèbre in Wales in 2007. This was the case of Shambo 
the Sacred Calf, a challenge by way of judicial review by a Krishna Community to 
the decision of the Welsh Assembly Government to issue a slaughter notice in respect 
of a bullock that had tested positively for Bovine tuberculosis. At ﬁrst instance, 
32 R (SB) v Governors of Denbigh High School [2007] 1 AC 100, [50]. Critics have pointed out that this 
approach represents an extension of the ‘speciﬁc situation’ principle in the art 9 jurisprudence, which 
had not been applied by the Strasbourg court to school pupils: Mark Hill and Russell Sandberg, ‘Is 
Nothing Sacred? Clashing Symbols in a Secular World’ [2007] Public Law 488.
33 R (SB) v Governors of Denbigh High School [2007] 1 AC 100, [98].
34 See R (SB) v Governors of Denbigh High School [2007] 1 AC 100, [68] (Lord Hoffman).
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His Honour Judge Hickinbottom (sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge) granted 
the application because there was no evidence that the government had correctly 
identiﬁed a legitimate public health objective under article 9(2) on which to justify 
a restriction.35 His Honour based this conclusion on careful analysis of the relevant 
policy documents and of the decision to slaughter. The government’s position was 
that it was ‘imperative public health objective that the risk of transmission of bTB 
is entirely eliminated from any bovine which positively reacts to a tuberculin test. 
That elimination can only occur if the animal is slaughtered’.36 On the other hand, 
the Community argued that because of the very great religious signiﬁcance of 
Shambo to them, an exception should be made and proposed to isolate the animal 
and enforce other health safeguards. The judge found that government’s policy was 
framed unduly narrowly and without any explanation of how it served the underlying 
public health considerations. The government had simply not correctly identiﬁed a 
legitimate objective to be balanced under article 9 in the ﬁrst place. The Court of 
Appeal disagreed, however, and found that the minister had public health (rather 
than rigid policy) in mind as the objective.37 The government’s policy of slaughter 
and surveillance where infection was discovered was to be regarded as a means rather 
than an objective in its own right. Moreover, the refusal to make an exception to the 
policy in the case of the bullock Shambo was proportionate to this broader objective.
Although this may appear to be a semantic difference, the underlying issue of how 
governmental bodies are required to justify policies that impinge on religious freedom 
is important. At the one pole — as the House of Lords made clear in Begum38 — it 
is whether a public body’s actions infringe rights rather than the process of reasoning 
that matters, especially in the case of bodies like school governors which do not 
have constant and easy access to specialist legal advice. Equally, however, public 
bodies should not be allowed to ‘Convention-proof ’ their actions though a ‘tick-
box’ exercise and then present the case for restriction of rights in a way that prevents 
genuine questioning of whether to do so is necessary in a democratic society.
The Hindu funeral pyre litigation is a further cautionary example of the approach to 
proportionality. In the ﬁrst instance decision in Ghai, Cranston J held that restrictions 
on open air funeral pyres were justiﬁed under article 9(2) as necessary in a democratic 
35 R (on the application of Suryanda) v Welsh Ministers [2007] EWHC 1376 (Admin).
36 Ibid [97].
37 R (on the application of Suryanda) v Welsh Ministers [2007] EWCA Civ 893.
38 See R (SB) v Governors of Denbigh High School [2007] 1 AC 100, [68] (Lord Hoffman).
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society.39 The government had intervened to defend the policy based on health 
and environmental considerations and for reasons of public morals. The applicant 
argued that such concerns could be met by regulation, rather than prohibition: sites 
could be licensed away from housing and where the public in general would have 
access, conditions could deal with the possibility of poor weather or atmospheric 
conditions and so on. The applicant was, however, hampered perhaps by lack of 
detailed reference to a scheme of licensing elsewhere among Convention states.
Particularly contentious, however, was evidence from the Ministry of Justice — 
accepted as relevant by the judge — referring to the ‘abhorrence’ that would be felt 
by a large proportion of the population at the idea of the disposal of human remains 
by funeral pyre, invoking the protection of morals. Cranston J ruled that deference 
was owed to the view of elected representatives’ assessment of public offence.
Prohibition on the basis of offence at the very idea of the beliefs or practices of others 
has a familiar ring to it: indeed, ironically, the common law offence of blasphemy was 
only abolished in 2008 by Parliament in the UK.40 Moreover, the state is not required 
to be consistent — some other religious practices that a signiﬁcant proportion of the 
population may well abhor are legally permitted, including male circumcision and 
animal ritual slaughter.
The Court of Appeal subsequently found that the litigation had in effect wrongly 
proceeded on the assumption that a Hindu-compliant funeral pyre could not be 
licensed under existing legislation.41 It concluded some structures used for Hindu 
cremations on funeral pyres could both comply with the legal requirement that 
cremation take place in a building and the applicant’s religious requirement that ﬁre 
was used rather than electricity and that sunlight should be able to shine directly 
on the dead body: they could therefore be licensed under the Cremation Act 1902.42
Nevertheless, the High Court decision in Ghai stands alongside those in Begum and 
Suryanda in demonstrating the approach to proportionality in relation to article 9 
39 Similarly, there was no violation of art 8 (respect for private and family life) since cremation on a 
funeral pyre was necessarily a public act rather than an aspect of private life (R (on the application 
of Ghai) v Newcastle CC and the Secretary of State [2009] EWHC 978, [138]). Moreover, even if 
art 8 did apply to some aspects of funeral arrangements, any interference was justiﬁed. Nor was 
there a violation of art 14 (discrimination in the enjoyment of Convention rights): the applicant 
had failed to establish that that the Council’s refusal had or the policy had a disproportionate 
impact on Hindus sharing his beliefs. Even if he had done so, however, the policy was capable of 
objective and reasonable justiﬁcation in Cranston J’s view (at [151]).
40 Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, s 79(1).
41 R (on the application of Ghai) v Newcastle CC and the Secretary of State [2010] EWCA Civ 59. 
42 This decision made it unnecessary, in the Court of Appeal’s view, to discuss any of the issues 
decided at ﬁrst instance by Cranston J: ibid [40].
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by UK courts. Although the results are disappointing, certainly by comparison with 
the more probing and rigorous analysis by South African or Canadian courts of the 
need for restrictions on religious liberty,43 this perhaps exempliﬁes a more general 
lightness of touch by judges in the UK. The article 9 cases are by no means unique 
in this regard.44
The problems that religious liberty claimants face in ﬁrst bringing their claims within 
the scope of article 9 and in overcoming state claims of the need for restrictions lead 
naturally to them pursuing alternative legal avenues for these claims — in particular, 
through use of anti-discrimination law.
By-passing the Human Rights Act 1998: Discrimination law
In a sense, the restricted approach to article 9 demonstrated in these decisions 
creates incentives for claimants to bring their challenges within the ambit of 
discrimination law, rather than human rights law. The advantages of doing so can be 
seen by comparing the Begum case with the successful outcome for the applicant in 
a comparable challenge brought by a 14-year-old Sikh school girl of Punjabi-Welsh 
heritage, to the decision of Aberdare Girls’ High School to prevent her from wearing 
a Kara (a religious bracelet) at her school. In R (on the application of Watkins-Singh) 
v Governing Body of Aberdare Girls High School 45 Silber J found that the decision 
not to grant a waiver from the school’s uniform policy to the claimant to permit her 
to wear the Kara constituted indirect discrimination on grounds of race under the 
Race Relations Act 1976 and on grounds of religion under the Equality Act 2006. 
The judge found that there was objective evidence that the wearing of the Kara was 
‘regarded universally by observant Sikhs as a matter of exceptional importance and 
it symbolises their loyalty to the teaching of their Gurus’. In view of this Silber J 
was satisﬁed that the school’s decision placed an observant Sikh like the applicant 
under a ‘particular disadvantage’ or ‘detriment’ (the test under section 1(1)(1)(A) 
Race Relations Act 1976 and section 45 (3) Equality Act 2006).
The key issue in satisfying the tests in discrimination law was that she genuinely 
believed for reasonable grounds that wearing the Kara was a matter of exceptional 
importance to her racial identity or her religious belief and it could be shown 
objectively to be of exceptional importance to her religion or race as a Sikh. Moreover, 
the Kara was unobtrusive (it was 50 millimetres wide and could be worn under long-
sleeved garments). Silber J stressed that far from allowing an exception to the school’s 
43 See, eg, Prince v President of Law Society of Cape of Good Hope (2002) SA 794; Multani v 
Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys [2006] 1 SCR 256.
44 Leigh and Masterman, above n 7, ch 6.
45 [2008] EWHC 1865 (Admin).
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policy being regarded as somehow discriminatory against pupils who might want to 
wear other religious symbols (such as cruciﬁxes), the correct approach was to focus 
on the speciﬁc detriment that this pupil would suffer if not allowed to wear the Kara, 
which would not affect other pupils without her beliefs.
There is a striking contrast in approach here to the Begum and Playfoot cases. It is 
plain that by using discrimination law where it is available a litigant may be able to 
overcome the stilted approach towards manifestation of religion in the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence.46 Whereas the article 9 jurisprudence emphasizes voluntary 
commitments undertaken by a litigant as a reason for denying that religious liberty 
is even in issue, religious discrimination law effectively turns the scales by putting a 
duty to accommodate upon the employer or school.47
Conclusion
Overall, it is unclear if the introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998 in the UK 
has by itself increased litigiousness concerning religion. The picture is a more complex 
one.
Paradoxically, religious groups were some of the main opponents when the Human 
Rights Act 1998 was progressing through Parliament — fearful for the effect of the 
Act on religious autonomy. It is perhaps ironic, then, that beleaguered religious 
groups have increasingly turned to human rights law to defend themselves in the face 
of more visible secularism and increasing pressures to privatise religion in public and 
social life. The language of human rights has a general resonance and acceptability 
46 There are signs that the European Court of Human Rights is moving away from a wide application 
of the Arrowsmith approach. In Case of Leyla Sahin v Turkey (Application no. 44774/98, 10 
November 2005) the Grand Chamber of the Court considered the compatibility with art 9 
of the prohibition on wearing the Islamic headscarf at Istanbul University and found the ban 
to be justiﬁed under art 9.2. The Court found that it was prescribed by law in pursuit of the 
legitimate aims of protecting the rights and freedoms of others and maintaining public order, in 
aiming to preserve the secular character of educational institutions, and was proportionate, thus 
satisfying art 9.2 (at [98-9]). By contrast, in Karaduman v Turkey (1993) 74 DR 93 the (former) 
Commission found no interference with a student’s art 9 right because of her voluntary acceptance 
of the rules applicable in a secular university (at 108). 
47 Some later discrimination rulings, however, in effect ‘read down’ discrimination legislation in 
light of the courts’ approach to art 9: see esp Islington London Borough Council v Ladele [2010] 1 
WLR 955, [55-8] (Lord Neuberger MR) (council’s refusal to accommodate marriage registrar’s 
religious objections to ofﬁciating at same-sex civil partnership ceremonies did not constitute 
religious discrimination). A challenge to Ladele is pending at the European Court of Human 
Rights.
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for beliefs and positions that the media and the liberal political and legal elite often 
otherwise treat as primitive or even distasteful.
In addition, minority religions that feel alienated or disadvantaged in Britain have 
also attempted to use the Act to ‘level-up’ their rights, although arguably tailor-made 
anti-discrimination legislation is a far more effective tool. It is perhaps signiﬁcant 
that a number of the cases discussed in this chapter have concerned questions of 
manifestation of religious belief by what are admittedly minority groups within a 
mainstream religion. Such claimants face the inevitable difﬁculty that their beliefs 
may appear extreme or unorthodox when compared with the majority of adherents 
of the religion concerned. There is a clear risk that public bodies committed to 
religious freedom will consider that they have done sufﬁciently when they have 
accommodated mainstream opinion. Courts can be prone to a variation of the same 
approach in judging the extent to which religious liberty is engaged according to the 
core or central beliefs of the religion in question, with peripheral views accorded less 
or no respect.
As with the experience of the Human Rights Act 1998 generally,48 few of these 
claims have been ultimately successful. For the most part, courts using the Act have 
conﬁrmed existing legal positions, albeit with new reasons. Nevertheless, the effect 
on public and political discourse has been considerable. Some of these developments 
are legally questionable or at least inconsistent — the Act has been cited, for example, 
as justiﬁcation for the Royal Navy for the decision to provide storage space on board 
ship for the equipment of a practising Satanist and as the rationale for the removal 
of bibles from some hospital wards. In time, however, a new sensitivity towards 
religious liberty may indeed take root. If so, something of the revolutionary fervour 
that greeted the legislation may yet be justiﬁed.
48 Leigh and Masterman, above n 7.
